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How to promote the innovative activities is an important problem for modern society. In this
paper, combining with the evolutionary games and information spreading, we propose a lattice
model to investigate dynamics of human innovative behaviors based on benefit-driven assumption.
Simulations show several properties in agreement with peoples’ daily cognition on innovative behav-
iors, such as slow diffusion of innovative behaviors, gathering of innovative strategy on “innovative
centers”, and quasi-localized dynamics. Furthermore, our model also emerges rich non-Poisson
properties in the temporal-spacial patterns of the innovative status, including the scaling law in
the interval time of innovation releases and the bimodal distributions on the spreading range of
innovations, which would be universal in human innovative behaviors. Our model provide a basic
framework on the study of the issue relevant to the evolution of human innovative behaviors and
the promotion measurement of innovative activities.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 05.40.Fb, 89.75.Da
I. INTRODUCTION
The research on Socio-Economic systems rises to be a
popular issue and attracts a great amount of researchers
in the recent decade [1–4], due to its inherent compli-
cated dynamics and macroscopic phenomenon as the tra-
ditional physical system. The foundational method and
models of statistical physics, nonlinear physics, complex
network, numerical simulation have been applied to the
problem of diffusion dynamics, opinion dynamics, traffic
flow, cascading failure, evolutionary game, human dy-
namics and so on. In social development, innovative ac-
tivity can be regarded as the source of human culture and
plays an important role in social advances. To promote
the innovative activities of people effectively is always a
critical factor for the success of a social system. Here, in-
novations always refer to new products, goods, services,
ideas, online creations, social norms and institutions and
so on if they are unknown within a particular group.
After an innovation emerges, it will probably face
tough diffusion situation contrasting to the dominative
mature technology, owing to kinds of reasons, such as its
imperfection or people’s stubbornness. The competing
course of two different kinds of products or information
is a popular topic[5–7]. Base on a continuous model put
forward in 2000, there are a serials of work [8–13] discuss
when technological development takes place somewhere,
how the agents response to neighbors’ change and how
their reaction contribute to the enhancement of techno-
logical level of society.
However, the innovative activities are not only sup-
pressed by difficulties in its spreading, but also in the
production of innovation which is the actually the first
step of innovative process. Despite extensive discus-
sion on innovations’ spread, on the problems of inno-
vative behavior, such as: how the innovative behavior
evolves in a interaction system, how the two procedures
of innovative activity-innovative behavior and innovation
diffusion-affects each other, and most significant, how to
promote people’s innovative behaviors and the spirit of
ingenuity, these relevant discussions still lack in previ-
ous studies. The process of innovation bursting has been
studied by introducing a technology space based on per-
colation theory[14, 15].
A typical model inspires us greatly is proposed by S.
Bornholdt, etc[16] based on the framework with the com-
petition and coexistence of multi-opinions. In this model,
innovation is introduced with three basic rules: major-
ity rule when accepting neighbors’ opinion, no repeating
of old ideas, and tiny chance to raise new idea. The
model clearly shows the characteristics of ”rapid rise,
slow decline, difficulty to replace” of innovation in sci-
entific paradigms’ development, and excites our curios-
ity in the innovative behavior itself. In reality, from the
development of discipline and technology, to companies
launching new products, or the decision of the topic of
a news report, blog, etc., there are always at least two
choices for people: to go into a brand new way, or just
to improve or follow an exiting one in the system. Thus,
there is a problem concerned with multi-choices.
When facing multiple choices, the cost and the pay-
off from the choice is usually a conclusive considera-
tion. The representative example is evolutionary game,
in which one makes different gains according to his own
and neighbors’ choices, states, or strategies (e.g. to co-
operate or to betray), and adopts his next strategy ac-
cording to the incomes after each play, mostly longing
for lower cost and future higher yield. This idea has
also been extended to learning process during innovation
2spread[5, 8, 9, 12, 13, 17, 18]. No matter adopting in-
novative or following behavior, one has to pay cost (in
the form of spending time, money, energy, etc. and tak-
ing a risk) and can obtain reward (in form of proceeds,
reputation, growing interest, etc.). Generally speaking,
comparing with the conventionalism and the copycat, in-
novative behaviors usually face much higher risks and
cost but can obtain some extra benefit after the success-
ful innovation, such as the patent income and wide repu-
tations. The following behavior is just the opposite situ-
ation with lower risks and lower benefit. Thus the most
successful agent (taking highest profits) in a local group
may be an innovator or a follower. Hence the innovative
and following behavior is just the two choices contradict
but interdependent with each other.
In this paper, we propose a modeling framework to
study the general feature in the evolution of innovation
behavior. Different to most of previous works that mainly
discuss the spreading of new technologies or new cultures,
we focus on the dynamics in the evolution of innovative
behaviors under the assumption that innovators have to
pay more price, and that innovative intention is stirred
up by huge rewards from the spreading of its innovations.
We try to investigate its basic dynamics, and to provide
new insights to understand what impacts on peoples’ in-
novative behaviors and how to encourage innovative be-
haviors effectively.
II. THE MODEL
To investigate the basic feature on the evolutionary dy-
namics of innovative behaviors, our model discards much
of detailed and particular factors, such as the differences
on innovative ability, the application values of innova-
tions, and so on. For simplicity, the individuals choose
binary strategies: to be innovators (I) or to be followers
(F). The innovators bring about significant progresses,
and followers make smaller improvement by following in-
novators. Two basic assumptions are considered in a gen-
eral way: (i) Comparing with the activities of just copy-
ing or following other’s innovations, innovative activities
have much more cost. (ii) From a general perspective,
while someone’s result is accepted by more individuals,
it is considered to be more successful and gains more re-
wards. And thus we assume, for an individual, no matter
it is the creator of innovation or not, it can obtain some
benefit from its spreading. This benefit is proportional
to the spreading range of the innovation from the indi-
vidual.
Based on the above two assumptions, the evolution
algorithms of our model can be described as follows:
(i) In L×L lattices with periodic boundary condition,
each node i represents an individual who holds an arbi-
trary type of information, and adopts binary strategies
s(i, t) to update its information: to be a follower (F) or
an innovator (I).
(ii) Our model has two timescales: t and τ . Each time
FIG. 1: (Color online) Illustration of tracks of information
spreading on a 10×10 lattice in a time step t. All of the tracks
begin with the I agents (red nodes) and respectively strings
several F agents (blue nodes). For the agent i = (x, y), no
matter F or I, its benefit Mi can be defined as the total num-
ber of agents whose information comes from him, for example,
M(6, 4) = M(2, 1) = 1, M(5, 7) = 23, M(2, 5) = 5.
step t includes several sub-steps τ .
(iii) At each sub-step τ during a time step t, we select
an arbitrary agent i who has not updated on its informa-
tion at the current t. If i is an I agent, it puts forward
new information (or say ”innovation”) that is marked as
mi(t). If node i is a F agent, it randomly contacts with
one of his neighbors j. If the neighbor’s information type
is the new one that is created in the current t (mj(t, τ) =
mk(t), say, here k is the I agent who puts forward this in-
formation type), the F agent i updates its information as
the neighbor’s (mi(t, τ+1) = mj(t, τ) = mk(t)). Noticed
that agent, no matter I or F, can only updates its infor-
mation one time during each t, denoting the competition
in the spreading of information (innovations).
(iv) For each update on its information, no matter I or
F agent it is, the agent consumes some cost. Here we set
the cost CI = a for I agents, and CF = 1 for F agents,
where a ≥ 1 means the relative cost of innovative activity
and is the main parameter of the model.
(v) When all the agents update their information, we
can calculate the payoff of each agent. For agent i, no
matter I or F, it can obtain the benefit Mi from the
spreading ranges of its information, which is defined as
the total number of followers whose information spreads
from it, as shown in Fig. 1 and described in Ref. 1.
And thus the final payoff of agent i is the difference of
its benefit and cost:
Pi = Mi − Ci =
{
Mi − 1, (i ∈ F ),
Mi − a, (i ∈ I).
(1)
3(vi) Agents update their strategies according to their
and their neighbors’ payoffs. The agent i compares pay-
offs of its own and neighbors’, and then decides its new
strategy s(i, t + 1) as the same as the winner’s. In case
there is more than one winner, we randomly choose one
of them (node i′, say) to learn from. The rule therefore
can be written as: s(i, t+1) = s(i′, t), if Pi′ ≥ Pk(k ∈ Ω,
where Ω is an assembly of i and his four neighbors). And
then the system goes into the next loop (t = t + 1 and
reset τ = 0) and repeats the above rules.ve rules.
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
In our simulations, we set the strategies of nodes ran-
domly as I or F at the first time step t = 0. The inno-
vators’ number nI will rapidly achieve an evolutionary
stable state in few time steps and then oscillates on a
tiny scale. In the following discussions we set the first
500 time steps (from t = 0 to t = 500) as the initializa-
tion process, and all the statistical properties discussed
below are calculated after the initialization process.
The typical patterns in the evolution of the model show
that the number of I agents decreases as the increasing
of the cost a, and these I agents usually gather to several
small clusters (Fig. 2 (a) and (b)), which have two basic
structural elements: the cross plaid and the chessboard-
like plaid. The evolution of patterns in several consec-
utive time steps shows that the two basic structural el-
ements usually alternatively vary and fluctuate in small
regions (Fig. 2 (b)). This gathering picture is generally
in agreement with the reality that most of the sci-tech
innovations are generated by some centers (e.g. higher
education institutions and big companies). Notice that
the present model dose not consider the mechanism that
can directly drive the gathering, such as the convenience
on the exchange of resource and knowledge. Here the
emergence of clusters is the result of the co-effect of the
randomly spreading of innovations and social learning on
the strategies of local winners.
More deep simulations show that the average propor-
tion of the I agents RI vs. the cost a of innovation
as a prefect inverse proportion function RI(a) ∝ a
−1
(a < N) which is almost independent to the size of
lattices, as shown in Fig. 2(c). This inverse propor-
tion relationship can be analyzed as follows: Accord-
ing to the algorithms of the model, the critical condi-
tion that the I agents stably exists is that the average
payoff 〈PI〉 of I agents is equal to their nearest neigh-
boring F agents. The average payoff of these nearest
neighboring F agents is 〈MI〉〈mF 〉 − 1, where 〈mF 〉 is the
average number of the nearest neighboring F agents of
each I agent, obviously 0 ≤ mF ≤ 4. So we have
〈PI〉 = 〈MI〉 − a =
〈MI〉
〈mF 〉
− 1. We thus can easily un-
derstand that 〈mF 〉 ≥ 2 and MI ≥ 2(a− 1) when a > 1,
namely in the evolutionary stable status, each I agent
averagely has at least two spreading branches. Consid-
ering the critical condition
∑
MI ≃ 2nI(a − 1) = N ,
we therefore have RI = nIN
−1 ∼ (a − 1)−1, and thus
RI ∼ a
−1 for a≫ 1. It shows that the cost of innovation
is indeed the major factor on the spreading of innovative
behaviors. However, the slow-decreasing inverse propor-
tion relationship implies that innovative behaviors can
exist even though the cost is much higher.
Fig. 2(b) indicates that the clusters of I strategy usu-
ally lingers in small regions and is difficult to diffuse
out. To give a visible sense, we compare the diffusion
speed of the I strategy in our model with that under
random-walking scenario. In order to insure the same
initial states of two simulations, we make the system be-
gin to evolve with two separated rules after the system
stabilized. In the random-walk scenario, at every step t,
each agent copies arbitrary one of his neighbors’ strategy
as his next strategy. In the process, the reappearance
of the same strategy is also allowed for a certain agent.
As shown in Fig. 3, in our model, this growth of the
area AI that I strategy has visited generally obeys the
power form with exponent about 0.7, which is unsensi-
tive to the value of the cost a and much lower than the
random-walk scenario. This quasi-localized picture indi-
cates that the diffusion of the innovative behavior is quit
slow, and the clusters of I agents can keep stable during
many time steps. In other words, the small regions that
I clusters are lingering can be regarded as “innovative
centers”, in which agents have much higher probability
to be I strategy.
We also investigate the temporal-spacial properties of
the information spreading process and surprisingly ob-
serve rich abnormal scaling laws and quasi-localized prop-
erties, especially when the cost a is higher.
Firstly, the temporal behavior on the change of in-
dividual’s strategies also shows obvious scaling proper-
ties. As shown in Fig. 4(a), the cumulative distributions
pc(tI) of the interval time steps tI between two consecu-
tive adoptions of I strategy trend to power-law-like form
along the growth of a. The exponent of pc(tI) is about
0.5 (corresponds to the exponent −1.5 of its probability
density distribution), which is a typical exponent on the
non-Poisson temporal properties of many real-world hu-
man activities [19, 20]. Moreover, the duration tl that
an agent keeps in I strategy obeys much similar scal-
ing property (inset of Fig. 4(a)). These temporal scaling
properties indicate that individual’s innovative behaviors
likes to burst in short time, and the I strategy usually
repeatedly visits a same individual in a short term, asso-
ciated with few long time durations keeping on F status.
Since many online information releases activities some-
what can be regarded as some form of ”innovative be-
havior”, tI also is the time interval of two consecutive
information releases, and the scaling interval time distri-
bution is much possible relevant to the universal charac-
ters in the temporal patterns of human creative activities
due to the similarities on the patterns [21–23].
Secondly, the distributions p(S) of the spreading area
S of each information in each time step t shows a bimodal
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FIG. 2: (Color online) (a) shows the typical global patterns of in the evolution of the model for different cost value a when
L = 50. (b) shows the evolution of the pattern in six consecutive time steps for a = 50 when L = 50. (c) The average
proportion of innovators RI vs. the innovation cost a, which obeys a scale-free behavior RI(a) ∝ a
−1. Results averaged over
50 independent runs, and each run is over 2000 time steps after initialization.
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The growth of the visited area AI(t) of
I strategy for different a (the curves with symbols), comparing
with the scenario with random-walk agents (the black and
blue curve). AI(t) also represents for the number of agents
who have ever held I strategy before. Parameter settings are
L = 100, and the results are averaged by 20 independent runs.
type mixed by a power law and a normal distribution:
p(S) = b exp(
−(S − S0)
2
2w2
) + cSγ + d. (2)
Since the information is created by I agents, obviously
Si = MI,i for the I agent i. As shown in Fig. 4(b), the
range of the front scaling section on p(S) grows along
the cost a, and the exponent γ ≃ −1.5, which is unsen-
sitive for all the parameters. The I agents in the low
I-strategy-density region have more probability to cre-
ate new information with higher S, due to the random
spread of information in the system free of competition
from other I agents in the same innovative cluster.
A noticeable feature on p(S) is its second peak, which
generally corresponds to the peak on the normal distribu-
tion section. The insert in Fig. 4(b) shows that the value
of the second peak S0 is almost linearly correlated on the
cost a. Considering RI(a) ∝ a
−1, we have S0 ∼ R
−1
I ;
namely S0 is much correlated to the average spreading
area of each information type. This result implies a lo-
calized picture on the dynamics in the system: in most of
its lifetime, each cluster of I agents drives the evolution
in its surrounding field and has almost independent dy-
namics to other I clusters, unless divides to two clusters,
merges to another one, and dies out. In other words, the
long-range correlations that drive the emergence of the
scaling property is broken and limited in the respective
innovative region with I cluster as the center.
IV. DISCUSSION
The present model discusses the benefit-driven evolu-
tion of innovative behaviors combining with the spread-
ing of information and social learning rules, based on the
following three basic assumptions: i) the higher cost of
innovative behavior; ii) people’s innovative behaviors is
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FIG. 4: (Color online) (a) The cumulative distribution pc(tI) of time intervals tI between each two consecutive adoptions of I
strategy for different a. The inset shows the cumulative distribution pc(tl) of the duration tl that an agent keeps I strategy. The
dashed dark gray lines in the main panel and inset indicate the scale-free property with exponent −0.50. (b) The distributions
p(S) of innovators’ opinion diffusing scope S for different a. The curve of a = 200 is well fitted by Eq. 2 (The red line), where is
the mixed function of power-law and normal distribution with fitting parameters S0 = 274.0, γ = −1.52, w = 211.8, b = 0.0013,
c = 0.16, d = 2.57× 10−8. The inset shows the fitting parameter S0 vs. a, where the dashed blue line denotes the proportional
relationship S0 ∼ a. Simulations run for L = 100 and over 2000 time steps after initialization, and all the results are averaged
over 20 independent runs.
mainly driven by their benefit; iii) the wider the spread-
ing range of innovation is, the more reward its innova-
tor will obtain. These assumptions have strong daily-life
basis and obey people’s intuitive feeling on innovative
behaviors.
Our model actually has only one effective parameter:
the relative cost a of innovative activity. The highlights of
the results of our model are the following basic features:
Firstly, the relative cost of innovative activity deeply
impacts on the dynamics of innovative behaviors. The
effects of the cost are not only shown in the number of
nodes with innovative status, but also on the temporal-
spatial patterns of individuals’ innovative activities and
the spreading of innovations (information). To reduce
this cost is an efficient way to promote innovative activ-
ities.
Secondly, the dynamics of the model shows quasi-
localized property, which is exhibited in several phenom-
ena: the gathering and slow diffusion of I status, and
the bimodal distributions on spreading ranges of infor-
mation. This localized picture indicates the emergence
of “innovative centers”, generally matching the reality
that most of important innovations are mainly created by
few organizations. Moreover, these “innovative centers”
are emerged naturally in our model due to the absence of
the diversity in innovative capability, implying the quasi-
localized property would be an intrinsic character in the
dynamics of innovative behaviors.
Finally, rich non-Poisson temporal-spatial properties
emerges in the situation with large cost (Fig. 4). The
scaling law on the interval time of information releases is
relevant to the patterns of real-world human creative ac-
tivities and online information releases [21, 23], implying
a novel type of dynamics in the emergence of fat-tailing
properties in human behaviors. The power-law section in
the distributions of spreading ranges of information also
is qualitatively similar to the empirical analysis of the
copy and follows of online information.
In summary, we provide a general framework to the
modeling studies on the dynamical evolution of human
innovative behaviors. This much simplified model ob-
tains rich phenomena matching to the real-world innova-
tive activities, indicating it is indeed effective to show the
basic dynamics in the evolution of innovative behaviors
and would be helpful in further studies on the promotion
of innovative activities.
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